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Abstract 
        Financial intermediaries (such as banks) are delegated to monitor borrowers 
(Diamond, 1984). In the merger wave, many acquirers raise funds by borrowing 
syndicated loans to fund their M&A deals (Huang, Lu, & Srinivasan, 2012). However, 
banks’ monitoring of borrowers does not enhance firm value to the extent that the 
acquirers’ shareholders can benefit (Huang et al., 2012). Based on unadjusted measures, 
we found that M&A deals financed by syndicated loans experience better post-merger 
operating performance (ROA) and creditworthiness (Altman’s Z Score and EDF). 
M&A deals financed by relationship lenders experience better post-merger operating 
performance (ROA) and creditworthiness (EDF). M&A deals financed by reputable 
lenders experience better post-merger operating performance (ROA) and 
creditworthiness (Altman’s Z Score and EDF). However, M&A deals financed by 
institutional lenders experience worse post-merger operating performance (ROA) and 
worse creditworthiness (EDF), and transactional lenders have almost no impact on the 
borrowers’ post-merger operating performance and creditworthiness.  
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1. Introduction 
        This paper investigates whether taking syndicated loans helps to improve a firm’s 
post-merger operating performance and creditworthiness, and whether taking 
syndicated loans from different types of lenders lead to different post-merger operating 
performance and creditworthiness. 
        Syndicated loans provide a large and increasingly important source of financing 
in the corporate loan market. As defined by Sufi (2007), a syndicated loan is a loan 
issued to a borrower by at least two financial institutions. Syndicated loans are a hybrid 
of private and public debt (Dennis & Mullineaux, 2000). The member financial 
institutions in a syndicated loan fall into one of two groups: lead arrangers or participant 
lenders. The loan syndication process starts when the borrower awards a mandate to a 
lead arranger and provides the lead arranger with the information about its business and 
operation (Kang, 2011). After a relationship is established, the lead arranger negotiates 
contract terms with the borrower and guarantees an amount for a price range (Sufi, 
2007). The lead arranger then prepares an information memorandum and turns to 
participant lenders that will fund part of the syndicated loan (Sufi, 2007; Kang, 2011).  
        Syndicated loans provide a large and increasingly important source of financing 
in the corporate loan market. In the U.S., non-financial firms obtain new syndicated 
loans worth nearly $1 trillion each year, which accounts for approximately 15% of their 
total debt outstanding (Sufi, 2007). Because of its importance in corporate finance, there 
is a vast literature that has looked into syndicated loans. The modern literature on 
financial intermediation has primarily focused on the banks’ role as relationship lenders 
(Boot, 2000). Banks are special because they are the delegated monitors who are 
responsible for screening prospective borrowers, collecting proprietary information 
from the borrowers, monitoring the borrowers, and developing a close relationship with 
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the borrowers over time to mitigate the problems of information asymmetry and moral 
hazard problems (Ramakrishnan & Thakor, 1984; Diamond, 1984; Boyd & Prescott, 
1986; James, 1987; Allen, 1990; Diamond, 1991; Boot, 2000). The close relationship 
between the banks and the borrowers has been shown to facilitate screening and 
monitoring and has given the banks a comparative advantage over de novo lenders 
(Boot, 2000). Relationship lending is beneficial because it facilitates the exchange of 
information between banks and borrowers so that more information credit contracting 
decisions can be made, and it also increases the availability of credit to information-
sensitive borrowers (Boot, 2000).  
        However, banks’ specialness as relationship lenders has been challenged by the 
proliferation of transaction-oriented lending (which means to syndicate loans and then 
sell them in the secondary loan market or securitize them because the corporate loan 
market has become more competitive with the entrance of non-commercial bank 
lenders), and significant institutional changes have taken place including the 
development of the secondary loan market and the securitization of various bank loans 
in recent years (Boot & Thakor, 2000; Li, Shao, & Saunders, 2015). In the corporate 
loan market, each bank can choose to offer either relationship loans or transactional 
loans. Although relationship lending has many benefits, it is costly to engage in 
relationship lending by developing relationships and obtaining proprietary information 
from the borrowers over time. Many banks have shifted from relationship lending to 
transactional lending (Boot & Thakor, 2000).  
        The other significant change that has transformed the structure of the syndicated 
loan market is the emergence of non-bank, i.e., institutional, lenders. Nowadays 
institutional lenders, which include private equity firms, hedge funds, collateralized 
loan obligations, mutual funds, insurance companies and a small set of specialized 
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lenders, are significant participants in the corporate loan market (Kang, 2011). Different 
from commercial banks, institutional lenders face less stringent regulations and are less 
likely to focus on relationship lending which involves the sale of multiple financial 
products/services over time. As a result, they are willing to assume more credit risk by 
lending to riskier borrowers for riskier purposes such as leveraged buy-outs and M&As 
in order to achieve lucrative returns (Nandy & Shao, 2007; Kang, 2011).  
        In the U.S. corporate loan market, three large banks, J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of 
America and Citi Group which have very high reputation for screening and monitoring 
borrowers account for over 55% of the market (Ross, 2010). In loan syndication, the 
participant banks rely on the reputation of the lead arranger who is responsible for due 
diligence, allocation of loan principal to participant lenders, monitoring the borrower, 
and renegotiation of loan terms to make lending decisions. Loans from reputable 
lenders provide more credible signals about borrowers’ quality than those from other 
lenders (Ross, 2010). While the reputable lenders enjoy a large market share, they have 
a greater incentive than other lenders to continue to screen and monitor which  reduce 
information asymmetry between borrowers and participant lenders in order to maintain 
their reputation, and ultimately to maintain the large market share (Sufi, 2007; Ross, 
2010). In addition, reputable lenders have a high level of competence in screening and 
monitoring borrowers, which makes their efforts more effective (Ross, 2010; Huang et 
al., 2012). 
        As we know, borrowers take syndicated loans for a variety of purposes (Li et al., 
2015). One of the purposes is to finance M&A deals (Huang et al., 2012). In the past 
decades, much literature has focused on the acquirers’ post-merger performance and 
many studies have found strong evidence of post-merger underperformance, although 
there is no consensus on the reason for the underperformance (Agrawal, Jaffe, & 
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Mandelker, 1992; Mitchell & Stafford, 2000). In a survey that summarized evidence 
from 130 studies from 1971 to 2001 on whether M&A pays, Bruner (2001) categorized 
findings into two types, i.e., findings based on the analysis of market-based returns to 
shareholders, and findings based on the analysis of reported financial performance (e.g. 
ROA, profit margins and capital, etc.) and summarized that one-third of the studies 
reported M&As’ post-merger underperformance, one-third reported M&A as value 
conservation, and one-third showed value creation. It seems that in the aggregate, 
returns to acquirers’ shareholders from M&As are essentially zero (Bruner, 2001). 
M&As do not necessarily cause underperformance. We argue that there could be other 
reasons that can lead to post-merger underperformance. Financial intermediation 
theories suggest that banks screen and monitor borrowers, which certifies and enhances 
the borrowers’ value (Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan & Thakor 1984). Therefore, 
acquirers’ post-merger performance provides a very good arena for us to examine 
whether syndicated loans add value to the borrowers, i.e., the acquirers in the context 
of M&As, and if so, to what extent. The results may shed light on the cause of post-
merger underperformance and show a possible solution to alleviate this problem. If 
taking syndicated loans creates value for the acquirers in M&A deals with lenders’ 
monitoring, the post-merger underperformance problem would be mitigated, and lack 
of monitoring of the management team could be a cause of underperformance; 
Therefore, shareholders may request the management team to take syndicated loans to 
help monitor the firm’s operation and eventually alleviate the post-merger 
underperformance problem.  Huang et al. (2012) have examined whether banks monitor 
corporate decisions by looking into the acquirers’ post-merger performance. 
Inconsistent with the financial intermediation theories, they did not find that syndicated 
loan-financed M&A deals are associated with better stock or accounting performance 
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compared to M&A deals financed by other sources. Instead, Huang et al. (2012) found 
strong evidence that banks tighten up the syndicated loan contract terms when financing 
M&A deals, including cutting short the loan maturity and imposing a higher collateral 
requirement and more covenant restrictions. Given the different lender types--
relationship lender, transactional lender, institutional lender, and reputable lender in the 
syndicated loan market, as explained above--who have different incentives to monitor 
their respective borrowers and different purposes for engaging in syndicated loans, it is 
worthwhile to examine further whether different types of lenders monitor corporate 
decisions to different extents that will lead to different post-merger performance and 
mitigate the post-merger underperformance problem in many M&A deals. To the best 
of our knowledge, there has been no academic study to investigate the impact of 
different types of syndicated loan lenders on M&A deals’ post-merger performance. 
        By obtaining a sample of 3,955 M&A deals from the SDC database, including 
2,416 syndicated loan financed (hereinafter referred to as LF) and 1,539 non-syndicated 
loan financed (hereinafter referred to as NLF) in the period of 2005 to 2011, whose 
acquirers are all U.S. publicly listed firms with above $1 million M&A transaction value, 
we tested the following hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 (H1): taking syndicated loans prior 
to M&A deals should add value that will improve post-merger operating performance 
and creditworthiness because lenders have incentives to screen and monitor their 
borrowers as well as collecting proprietary information from their borrowers (Li et al., 
2015).   Hypothesis 2 (H2): syndicated loans provided by relationship lenders should 
add value that will improve post-merger operating performance and creditworthiness 
because relationship lenders have an incentive to screen borrowers, which enables them 
potentially to block value-reducing M&A deals by withholding the loan and to monitor 
the borrowers (Diamond, 1984). Hypothesis 3 (H3): syndicated loans provided by 
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transactional lenders may not add value that will not impact post-merger operating 
performance and creditworthiness because they have less monitoring incentive than 
relationship lenders. Transactional lenders allocate more resources to loan distribution 
and trading than to monitoring (Boot & Ratnovski, 2012). Hypothesis 4 (H4): 
syndicated loans provided by institutional lenders may reduce value that will worsen 
post-merger operating performance and creditworthiness because they exploit loan 
information gained from lending to make a profit by trading the borrowers’ stocks or 
facilitating possible M&A deals of the borrowers rather than monitoring them (Nandy 
& Shao, 2007; Kang, 2011). Hypothesis 5 (H5): syndicated loans provided by reputable 
lenders should add value that will improve post-merger operating performance and 
creditworthiness because they have great incentive to monitor the borrowers in order to 
maintain their good reputation and ultimately maintain their large market shares (Booth 
& Smith, 1986; Chemmanur & Fulghieri 1994a; Chemmanur & Fulghieri 1994b).  
        We measure the acquirers’ performance by using ROA. To access a firm’s 
performance, researchers generally either use accounting-based measures such as ROA 
(return on assets) and ROE (return on equity) or market-based measures such as Tobin’s 
Q and market return (Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan, & Yiu, 1999; Combs, Crook, & Shook, 
2005; Hult, et al., 2008). Among accounting-based measures of firm performance, ROA 
is widely used (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998). It is 
computed as the firm’s net income over its total assets, which shows the efficiency with 
which a firm employs its assets (Carpenter & Sanders, 2002). Li et al. (2015) and Huang 
et al. (2012) have adopted ROA as a measure for firm performance. In this paper, we 
will also adopt ROA as the firm performance measure which is of interest to the 
shareholders. In addition, we will also look into the acquirers’ post-merger 
creditworthiness from the debtholders’ perspective because we found that M&As’ post-
7 
 
merger creditworthiness has been underexplored. It will be interesting to look into this 
area when we investigate post-merger operating performance from the shareholders’ 
perspective. Creditworthiness can be measured by KMV Merton-based EDF (Expected 
Default Frequency) and Altman’s Z-Score (Li et al., 2015).  Debtholders care about 
whether the borrowers will default. The implied probability of default, also called EDF, 
is a measure of credit risk calculated as a function of distance to default with a premise 
that a firm will become bankrupt when the market value of its assets is less than its 
default barrier, i.e., its debt (Asberg & Shahnazarian, 2008). Altman’s Z Score is a 
measure of financial distress developed by Professor Edward Altman in the year 1968. 
It predicts the probability that a firm will go into bankruptcy in two years and is used 
to predict corporate defaults (Altman, 1968). We will follow Li et al., (2015) by utilizing 
EDF and Altman’s Z Score as two creditworthiness measures.   
        Our empirical investigation reveals that taking syndicated loans prior to M&A 
helps to improve post-merger operating performance and creditworthiness, that taking 
syndicated loans from relationship lenders prior to M&A helps to improve post-merger 
operating performance and creditworthiness, that taking syndicated loans from 
transactional lenders prior to M&A does not impact post-merger operating performance 
and creditworthiness, that taking syndicated loans from institutional lenders prior to 
M&A worsens post-merger operating performance and creditworthiness, and that 
taking syndicated loans from reputable lenders prior to M&A improves post-merger 
operating performance and creditworthiness. We conducted two robustness checks 
including propensity score matching (PSM) and industry adjusted measures. Findings 
for H1, H2, H3 and H5 remain robust when we apply propensity score matching. 
Findings for H1, H2, H3, H4 and H5 remain robust for post-merger operating 
performance when we adopt industry adjusted measures, but only H2, H3 and H4 
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remain robust for post-merger creditworthiness when we adopt industry adjusted 
measures. 
        This paper is closely related to recent empirical papers, especially Huang et al. 
(2012), which found that lenders’ monitoring of borrowers’ (i.e., acquirers in the context 
of M&A) corporate decisions do not enhance lenders’ firm value. Different from Huang 
et al. (2012), we looked into long-term operating performance and creditworthiness 
rather than announcement effects, compared the post-merger measures between LF and 
NLF M&A deals, and also compared the impact of different types of lenders on M&A 
deals’ post-merger measures, and found statistically significant results that support our 
hypotheses. Based on the results of unadjusted measures and robustness checks, we 
provide new insights on bank specialness and the reasons of post-merger 
underperformance and credit deterioration by showing that taking syndicated loans is 
beneficial to shareholders and debtholders in general, that taking loans from 
relationship lenders is beneficial to shareholders and debtholders, that taking loans from 
transactional lenders does not impact shareholders and debtholders and that taking loans 
from reputable lenders is beneficial to shareholders and debtholders.  
        The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
theoretical and empirical literature and delineates the contribution of our study. Section 
3 develops testable hypotheses. Section 4 explains our sample selection, variable 
construction and methodology. Section 5 presents empirical analysis and results 
discussion including univariate and multivariate analysis. Section 6 discusses further 
research. Finally, section 7 draws a conclusion.  
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2. Literature review and delineation of our contribution 
        Diamond (1984) developed the theory of financial intermediation based on 
minimum cost production of information useful to resolve incentive problems. 
Information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers has played a key role in the 
development of this theory (Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, & Srinivasan, 2009). An 
intermediary, such as a bank, is delegated the role of costly monitoring the borrower. 
Banks develop close relationships with borrowers over time such that this proximity 
between the bank and the borrower facilitates screening and monitoring, and ultimately 
overcomes problems of asymmetric information (Boot, 2000). Amongst the many 
financing options, syndicated loans are worthy of analysis because they represent a 
hybrid of private and public debt and because the syndicated loans market where a loan 
is divided among more than one lender is large and growing rapidly (Dennis & 
Mullineaux, 2000). In the context of syndicated loans, usually only the lead arranger 
has a relationship with the borrower and the intensity is between that of a bank loan and 
a public debt (Dennis & Mullineaux, 2000).  
        With extensive literature that suggests lenders screen and monitor their borrowers, 
it is worthwhile to examine whether the lenders monitor the borrowers’ corporate 
decisions to an extent that enhances the borrowing firms’ value. M&As, one of the most 
important corporate decisions, provides an ideal arena to investigate. Given that many 
M&As experience post-merger underperformance, if lenders’ screening and monitoring 
indeed add value to the borrowers, the post-merger underperformance problem of 
M&As financed by syndicated loans should be mitigated compared to those not 
financed by syndicated loans. Huang et al. (2012) examined whether banks who 
provided loans to fund M&As monitor firms to an extent that will benefit the acquirers’ 
shareholders. Inconsistent with what the conventional theory suggests, they did not find 
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that bank-financed M&A deals have better stock performance or accounting 
performance than non-bank-financed M&A deals. Instead, they found that banks 
tighten up their loan contract terms such as cutting short the loan maturity, imposing 
higher collateral requirement and more covenant restrictions. However, this does not 
mean the screening and monitoring of all lenders in syndicated loans do not add value 
to the borrowers. It would be interesting to further investigate different types of lenders’ 
monitoring roles and their borrowers’ corresponding post-merger operating 
performance in the context of M&A. We will further review the literature on different 
lender types. By using M&A as an arena, we can also look into acquirers’ post-merger 
creditworthiness, which is an area that has been relatively underexplored. 
        Boot (2000) defined relationship banking as the provision of financial services by 
a financial intermediary that invests in obtaining customer-specific information and 
evaluates the profitability of the investments through multiple interactions with the 
same customer over time. The information obtained when the bank provides screening 
and monitoring services can be used in multiple interactions with the same customer by 
benefiting from the intertemporal information reusability which gives the bank 
incentive to screen and monitor its borrowers (Diamond, 1984; Rajan & Winton, 1995; 
Greenbaum & Thakor, 2007). In contrast, transaction banking that does not aim at an 
information-intensive relationship with a customer cannot benefit from intertemporal 
information reusability because transaction banking only focuses on a single transaction 
with a customer or multiple identical transactions with various customers (Boot, 2000; 
Boot & Thakor, 2000). Boot (2000) also documented the major benefits of relationship 
banking. Firstly, relationship banking facilitates information exchange between the 
lender and the borrower because the borrower might be more willing to reveal more 
information to the relationship lender than to a transactional lender and the relationship 
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lender may have stronger incentives to invest in costly information production (Boot, 
2000). Secondly, relationship banking also increases the available credit to information-
sensitive borrowers (Boot, 2000). Furthermore, Boot and Thakor (2000) shed light on 
the distinction between relationship lending and transactional lending by highlighting 
that relationship lenders use their expertise to improve the borrowers’ project payoff, 
whereas transactional lenders provide pure funding transaction, a commodity product 
without sector-specific investments connected with relationship lending. Bharath et al. 
(2009) examined the impact of relationships in lowering information asymmetries 
between lenders and borrowers and found that repeated borrowing from the same lender 
helps in lowering loan spreads. They also estimated the cut-off point between 
relationship lending and transactional lending.  
        According to traditional financial intermediary theories, banks are special because 
they engage in relationship lending by serving their unique delegated monitor role with 
a comparative advantage and enhanced incentive in proprietary information production, 
screening and monitoring the borrowers, and developing relationships with the 
borrowers to mitigate information asymmetry and moral hazard problems (Brealey, 
Leland, & Pyle, 1977; Campbel & Kracaw, 1980; Diamond, 1984; James, 1987; Boot, 
2000; Ross, 2010).  However, Gande and Saunders (2012) found that the developing 
strength and depth of the secondary loan market has significantly changed the nature of 
bank specialness. Many banks have shifted from relationship lending to transactional 
lending (Boot & Thakor, 2000). Li et al. (2015) extended this strand of literature by 
directly comparing and contrasting relationship lending and transactional lending.  
They argued that transactional lenders have lower monitoring incentives than 
relationship lenders because transactional lenders inefficiently allocate more resources 
to marketing and distributing the loans during the primary syndication process rather 
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than diligently screening potential borrowers, that transactional lenders’ specialization 
in syndicating tradable loans makes their loans more liquid than relationship lenders’. 
and that transactional lenders may use their tradable loans to facilitate their ex post 
trading activities. As a result, Li et al. (2015) expected that borrowers borrowing from 
transactional lenders would have worse operating performance and creditworthiness 
after loans’ issuance and found strong evidence to support their hypotheses in their 
empirical investigation.  In addition, Li et al. (2015) also found that transactional loans 
involve a greater number of nonbank institutional lenders (i.e., private equity firms, 
hedge funds, collateralized loan obligations, mutual funds, insurance companies, and a 
small set of specialized lenders) than relationship loans and institutional participation 
provides a channel for transactional lenders to generate and improve their loans’ 
liquidity.  
        In fact, institutional lenders have been increasingly active in the syndicated loan 
market (Kang, 2011). Kang (2011) documented that the proportion of institutional 
lenders in the syndicated loan market increased from 11% in year 1987 to 26% in year 
2007, and the number of institutional lenders in the syndicated loan market was more 
than that of bank lenders from year 1992 to year 2009. Institutional lenders have already 
become the most active loan traders in the secondary market who promote mutual 
interaction between the primary and secondary loan markets and improve loan market 
efficiency (Nandy & Shao, 2007). Nandy and Shao (2007) asked several questions 
regarding institutional participation in the syndicated loan market. They showed that 
institutional lenders participate in the syndicated loan market because it rewards them 
with a lucrative return. Institutional lenders primarily lend to riskier borrowers for 
riskier purposes such as M&As. Nandy and Shao (2007) documented that institutional 
lenders are uninformed investors compared to relationship lenders who can derive 
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private information from their existing relationship (Peterson & Rajan, 1994). They 
found that institutional lenders charge a much higher spread since they would have to 
engage in costly information production, which in turn encourages institutional lenders 
to participate in the secondary loan market rather than develop a close relationship with 
the borrowers in order to benefit from intertemporal information reusability. Consistent 
with their information production argument, Nandy and Shao (2007) found a much 
higher percentage of institutional loans are traded in the secondary loan market, 
institutional loans have shorter holding periods by their original lenders and earn higher 
first trading day returns. As a result, institutional lenders do not have as strong an 
incentive to monitor the borrower as relationship lenders.  
        Different from institutional lenders, reputable lenders have a strong incentive to 
monitor the borrowers. It’s recognized that banks play a special certification role 
through lending and delegated monitoring (Diamond, 1984; Fama, 1985). When a firm 
is relatively unknown, investors rely on third parties, reputable lenders in the context 
of the syndicated loan market who access the firm (i.e., the borrower)’s private 
information in the screening and monitoring process (Cook, Schellhorn, & Spellman, 
2001) to bridge the asymmetric information gap between the investors and the unknown 
firm. Billet, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995) found that lenders with higher reputations 
measured by credit rating generate a more positive borrower stock price response. Cook 
et al. (2001) defined lender certification as the process where the lender identifies good 
borrowers and transmits the information about the borrower’s quality and 
creditworthiness to the investors by syndicating loans to them. They found that 
reputable lenders who do not impose collateral requirements are able to exact a 
certification premium based on their own reputation measured by their credit rating and 
asset size. That is to say, reputable lenders have a strong incentive to serve their 
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delegated screening and monitoring role in order to earn the certification premium. 
Different from previous literature, Ross (2010) adopted the lender’s market share as a 
proxy for its reputation and found that the stock price response of borrowers of the 
dominant banks (i.e., reputable lenders), which account for more than 50% of the 
syndicated loan market in the U.S, is more favorable and these reputable lenders have 
particularly high reputations for screening and monitoring borrowers. The commanding 
market share has given them very strong incentives to screen and monitor their 
borrowers, which makes the reputable lenders’ reputation and market share self-
reinforcing.  
        Recognizing that different types of lenders of syndicated loans have different 
screening and monitoring incentives, we contribute to the literature by examining 
whether different types of lenders will monitor borrowers’ corporate decisions to 
different extents, which impacts the borrowers’ post-merger operating performance and 
creditworthiness differently, and benefits shareholders/debtholders. Our study also adds 
to the growing literature on whether lenders monitor corporate decisions of borrowers 
in the context of M&A to the extent that will improve their performance and 
creditworthiness by comparing the post-merger operating performance and 
creditworthiness of LF and NLF M&As. We also contribute to the literature of M&As 
by exploring whether lack of monitoring is one of the reasons that leads to the acquirers’ 
post-merger underperformance.  
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3. Hypotheses development 
3.1 Monitoring role 
        Financial intermediation theories suggest that lenders screen and monitor 
borrowers which certifies and enhances their borrowers’ value (Diamond, 1984; 
Ramakrishnan & Thakor 1984). Many papers have documented that acquirers in M&A 
deals experience post-merger underperformance but they have not gained consensus on 
the reason (Chang, 2011). In the context of M&A, acquirers whose deals are financed 
by syndicated loans should have experienced initial screening that blocks value-
reducing M&As by withholding financing and by continuous monitoring by their 
lenders, and as a result their post-merger operating performance should be better as 
compared to deals not financed by syndicated loans. We argue that the lack of screening 
and monitoring is one of the reasons that leads to post-merger underperformance and 
credit deterioration. Therefore, we make the following hypothesis: 
        H1: The post-merger operating performance and creditworthiness of borrowers 
(i.e,. acquirers in M&As) whose M&A deals are financed by syndicated loans will be 
better compared to M&A deals not financed by syndicated loans. 
3.2 Incentives to monitor 
        Based on the percentage of loans being resold, there are two types of lenders: 
relationship lenders and transactional lenders (Boot & Thakor, 2000). Relationship 
lenders utilize their expertise to improve the borrowers’ project payoff and usually hold 
the loans to maturity. By contrast, transactional lenders provide pure funding 
transaction without sector-specific knowledge by underwriting and selling loans before 
maturity (Boot & Thakor, 2000). There are different views on how loan resale and 
securitization impact lenders’ monitoring incentive, including Boot and Ratnovski 
(2012) who suggest that lenders who engage in trading loans would inefficiently 
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allocate more resources to trading so that they will compromise monitoring efforts. Li 
et al. (2015) share the same view as Boot and Ratnovski (2012) by arguing that 
transactional lenders inefficiently allocate resources to trade rather than monitoring 
borrowers, that transactional lenders are more likely to hold loans with higher liquidity 
that enable them to exercise their “exit option” more easily with reduced monitoring 
incentive, and that transactional lenders’ more salable loans facilitate their trading 
activities to reduce monitoring incentive. Winton and Yerramilli (2012) argue that 
lenders who engage in “originate-to-distribute” loans will maintain their incentive to 
monitor for reputational concerns. We share a similar view as Boot and Ratnovski (2012) 
and Li et al. (2015) because we believe that, with limited resources, it is difficult for 
transactional lenders to ensure that they have as strong an incentive as relationship 
lenders and genuinely dedicate the same amount of time and effort to monitor their 
borrowers in the way that relationship lenders do, even if the transactional lenders try 
to monitor in order to maintain their reputation. Transactional lenders’ monitoring effort 
will not have an impact on the borrowers’ performance.  Accordingly, we develop the 
following hypotheses:  
        H2: The post-merger operating performance and creditworthiness of borrowers 
(i.e., acquirers in M&As) whose M&A deals are financed by relationship lenders will 
be better. 
        H3: Transactional lenders do not have an impact on the post-merger operating 
performance and creditworthiness of borrowers (i.e,. acquirers in M&As) whose M&A 
deals are financed by transactional lenders. 
3.3 Institutional participation 
        Institutional lenders are found to be increasingly active in the syndicated loan 
market (Kang, 2011) and they constitute an important channel to improve syndicated 
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loans’ liquidity and salability (Li et al., 2015) because their participation in the 
syndicated loan market provides them with lucrative returns (Nandy & Shao, 2007). 
Different from relationship lenders, institutional lenders are uninformed investors 
because they do not possess private information derived from existing relationships 
(Peterson & Rajan, 1994; Nandy & Shao, 2007). Institutional loans have shorter holding 
periods by their original lenders and more than 30% of institutional loans are traded in 
the secondary market (Nandy & Shao, 2007).  In such a background, it is not surprising 
that institutional lenders do not have an incentive to develop a close relationship with 
their borrowers and monitor them to benefit from intertemporal information reusability. 
They only engage in costly information production in order to trade their loans and 
profit in the secondary market. Because institutional lenders are willing to assume more 
credit risk by lending to riskier borrowers for riskier purposes and have little incentive 
to monitor them (Nandy & Shao, 2007; Kang, 2011), it is likely that M&A deals 
financed by institutional lenders will experience worse performance. We develop the 
hypothesis as below:  
        H4: The post-merger operating performance and creditworthiness of borrowers 
(i.e., acquirers in M&As) whose M&A deals are financed by institutional lenders will 
be worse. 
3.4 Lender’s reputation 
        When a borrower is relatively unknown, participant lenders rely on reputable 
lenders in the syndicated loan to access the borrower’s private information in the 
screening and monitoring process (Cook et al., 2001) to bridge the asymmetric 
information gap between the investors and the unknown borrower. Lender certification 
serves as the process to identify good borrowers and transmit the information about the 
borrower’s quality and creditworthiness to the investors by syndicating loans to them 
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(Cook et al., 2001). Lenders who do not impose collateral requirements are able to exact 
a certification premium based on their reputation (Cook et al., 2001).  Thus, reputable 
lenders have strong incentive to serve their delegated screening and monitoring role to 
maintain their reputation so that they can continuously earn the certification premium. 
Therefore, we have the following hypothesis: 
        H5: The post-merger operating performance and creditworthiness of borrowers 
(i.e., acquirers in M&As) whose M&A deals are financed by reputable lenders will be 
better. 
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4. Sample selection, variable construction and methodology 
4.1 Sample selection 
        For new loan issues and secondary loan sales, our primary data source is from 
Thomson Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC)’s Dealscan syndicated loan 
database. Our M&A data are collected from Thomson Reuters SDC database. Annual 
financial statement information until the year 2013 is obtained from Compustat. We 
rely on lenders’ prior 5 years’(i.e., year t-4 to year t) loan syndication and loan trading 
activities to identify TLs and TL-led loans in year t+1.  Because secondary market loan 
trading data starts in year 1999 (i.e., year t), the earliest available year in which we can 
identify TL-led loans is year 2000 (i.e., year t+1). We consider all loans taken by an 
acquirer 5 years prior to the M&A deal announcement dates to be used to finance the 
M&A deal, and the lenders monitor the acquirer to a certain extent (any loan taken by 
the acquirer before or after the 5-year period is excluded). If the acquirer in an M&A 
deal announced in year 2005 that it has taken any loan during the period from year 2000 
to year 2004, the M&A deal is considered LF, otherwise NLF. Therefore, our sample 
period starts from year 2005. Our sample period ends at year 2011 so that we can 
investigate all acquirers’ post-merger operating performance and creditworthiness in 
the 1st and 2nd year after the merger. Therefore, we select acquirers of M&A deals in 
SDC database during the period of 1 January, 2005 to 31 December, 2011 as our sample.  
        We first screen SDC data during year 2005 to year 2011. We have 25,293 
observations in our sample during year 2005 to year 2011.  We then filter the data by 
requiring that the acquirers must be U.S. firms, M&A transaction values must be at least 
$1 million, deal status must be completed and have 15,885 observations.  
        In our second step, we filter out the observations whose firm assets are less than 
$1 million in Compustat. Then we merge SDC data with Compustat data by using 6-
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digit CUSIP and the calendar year of the financial statement announcement date to 
retrieve financial statement information. We also merge SDC data with EDF data by 
using GVKEY and the calendar year. We then filter out the observations with missing 
M&A announcement dates after the previous procedure. We have 3,955 observations at 
the end of the second step. 
        In the last step, we join the data from our second step by 6-digit CUSIP with 
Dealscan-Compustat link data provided by Michael Roberts in order to identify deals 
financed by syndicated loans and obtain information to calculate the intensity of lender 
monitoring variables of the four types of lenders. In the final sample, we have 2,416 
M&A deals financed by loans and 1,539 not financed by loans.   
4.2 Variable construction 
4.2.1 Identifying LF M&A deals 
        We define a M&A deal as LF if the acquirer has taken at least one syndicated loan 
during the 5-year period prior to the M&A announcement date. If the acquirer has not 
taken any syndicated loans during the same 5-year period, then its M&A deal is 
considered NLF. In total, 2,416 deals are classified as LF and the remaining 1,539 deals 
are NLF. The loan-finance dummy equals 1 if the deal has been identified as loan-
financed and 0 otherwise.  
4.2.2 Identifying relationship lenders (RLs) and RL-led loans 
        Similar to Li et al. (2015), we also follow Bharath et al. (2011) to identify the lead 
lender in a syndicated loan as a RL if it has led at least one loan to the same borrower 
in the past 5 years. We then identify a syndicated loan as a RL-led loan if it meets both 
of the two criteria: (1) at least one of the lead lenders in the syndicated loan has been a 
RL to the borrower in the past 5 years (i.e., it has lent to the borrower in the past 5 
years); (2) no TL acts as a lead lender in the syndicated loan.  
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        In addition, because the information held by a bank is likely to be inherited by the 
bank who takes it over in bank merger cases (Bharath et al., 2011), we also consider 
bank mergers’ potential impact on banking relationship and recognize the potential 
transfer of this relationship from the target bank to the bidder bank. The relationship 
dummy equals 1 if the loan has been identified as RL-led loan and 0 otherwise.  
4.2.3 Identifying transactional lenders (TLs) and TL-led loans 
        We follow Li et al. (2015) to identify the lead lender in a syndicated loan as a TL 
if it has syndicated and resold a high percentage (top 20 percentile) of loans in the past 
5 years. Based on a 5-year moving window from year t-4 to t, we adopt the same 
formula as in Li, et al. (2015) to first calculate 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑟/𝑡, number of resold loans to total 
number of syndicated loans for each lead lender i in year t where t=2004,2005…2011 
as below: 
Ratior/t=
Number of loans originated by lender i from year t−4 to t and resold before t
Total number of loans originated by lender i from t−4 to t
      (1) 
We rank all the lenders by  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑟/𝑡 and identify those ranked in the top 20 percentile 
as transactional lenders. Then we identify a syndicated loan issued in year t+1 as a TL-
led loan if at least one of the lead lenders in the loan is a TL. The transactional dummy 
equals 1 if the loan has been identified as TL-led loan and 0 otherwise.  
4.2.4 Identifying institutional lenders 
        We follow the same method as Nandy and Shao (2007) to identify the lead lender 
in a syndicated loan as an institutional lender. That is to say, at the facility level, if the 
loan is designed to be syndicated to institutional investors only (i.e., hedge funds, 
private equity funds, and hybrid funds as lenders) and identified as an institutional loan 
by Dealscan, we consider its lender to be an institutional lender. The institutional 
dummy equals 1 if the loan’s lender is an institutional lender and 0 otherwise.  
4.2.5 Identifying reputable lenders 
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        We identify the lead lender in a syndicated loan as a reputable lender if it has been 
one of the top three banks based on annual market shares of syndicated loans market. 
The reputable dummy equals 1 if the lead bank is one of the top three banks and 0 
otherwise.  
4.3 Methodology 
        To test our hypothesis H1 regarding the effect of lenders’ screening and monitoring 
role, we rely on an OLS regression to compare the syndicated loan borrowers’ post-
merger operating performance and creditworthiness with those who have not taken any 
syndicated loan to finance the M&A deals. 
        To test our hypothesis H2, H3, H4 and H5 regarding the impact of different types 
of lenders’ different monitoring incentive intensity and different purpose to involve 
themselves in the syndicated loans, we adopt an OLS regression to compare the post-
merger operating performance and creditworthiness of syndicated loan borrowers who 
have taken loans from a certain type of lenders with those who have taken loans from 
other types of lenders.  
        The detailed regression model setup will be provided and discussed later in section 
5. 
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5. Empirical analysis and results discussion 
5.1 Univariate analysis 
5.1.1 Distribution of LF and NLF M&A deals 
        Table 1 reports the distribution of M&A deals in each year. In panel A, column 2 
reports the number of M&A deals each year during the period from year 2005 to year 
2011. The number of M&A deals started to drop prominently from year 2008 when the 
financial crisis happened. Columns 3 and 4 report the number of M&A deals each year 
during the same period that are NLF and LF respectively. Each year, the number of LF 
M&A deals is bigger than that of NLF with the ratio of at least 3:2. This shows that 
more M&A deals are LF during our sample period. In panel B, columns 2 to 5 report 
the mean of monitoring intensity of different types of lenders each year during the 
period from year 2005 to year 2011. Reputable lenders have the highest intensity each 
year. Relationship lenders and transactional lenders have similar intensity. Institutional 
lenders have the lowest intensity.  
5.1.2 Descriptive statistics 
        Table 2 presents the summary statistics of acquirers’ performance, 
creditworthiness, characteristics, and deal characteristics. Amongst the sample M&A 
deals, we classify them as either NLF or LF. The summary statistics of the whole sample, 
NLF and LF M&A deals are reported from Panel A to C.  In addition, we also reported 
the means of different dimensions of the whole sample, NLF and LF M&A deals and 
their difference in Panel D. The means of LF deals are significantly different from NLF 
deals in all dimensions except EDF𝑡−1. In the one year before the deals, we found that 
the acquirers’ ROA of LF deals is positive whereas the acquirers’ ROA of NLF deals is 
negative (4.70 vs. -2.59). Moreover, the acquirers’ Altman’s Z-Score of LF deals is 
greater than that of NLF deals in the one year before the deals (1.83 vs. 0.53). LF deals 
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have the same EDF (0.3 vs. 0.3). In year t+1 (i.e., one year from the M&A 
announcement date), acquirers of LF M&A deals have higher ROA and Altman’s Z-
Score than those of NLF deals. LF deals’ EDF become lower than NLF deals’ (0.06 vs. 
0.08) Further, ROA𝑡+1 of LF deals is positive whereas ROA𝑡+1 of NLF deals is negative 
(3.06 vs. -10.07). We have similar findings in year t+2. Acquirers of LF M&A deals 
have higher ROA and Altman’s Z-Score than those of NLF deals, and they have lower 
EDF than that of NLF deals. Further, ROA𝑡+2 of LF deals is positive whereas ROA𝑡+2 
of NLF deals is negative (1.86 vs. -11.58). On average, acquirers of LF M&A deals 
have better performance (measured by ROA) and creditworthiness (measured by 
Altman’s Z Score and EDF) prior to the M&A announcements. After the merger, the 
increasing difference between the means suggests that although acquirers of LF deals 
and NLF deals both have worse performance (measured by ROA) and creditworthiness 
(measured by Altman’s Z Score and EDF), acquirers of NLF deals suffer more severely 
than those of LF deals. These results are consistent with H1. It proves that taking 
syndicated loans prior to M&A deals helps mitigate the post-merger underperformance 
problem.  Table 2 also shows that acquirers of LF deals are slightly more undervalued 
with a lower book-to-market ratio (0.52 vs. 0.55), have bigger firm size, and are more 
leveraged compared to those of NLF deals (7.54 vs. 5.81 and 0.24 vs. 0.11), that more 
LF deals are paid 100% by cash (0.42 vs. 0.33), that they are about the same in terms 
of combined method as NLF deals (0.55 vs. 0.58), and that LF deals have a bigger M&A 
transaction value but smaller relative size compared to NLF deals (4.49 vs. 3.32 and 
0.17 vs. 0.30).  
5.2 Multivariate analysis 
5.2.1 Test of H1 
        In H1, we hypothesize that acquirers whose M&A deals are LF will have better 
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operating performance and creditworthiness than those of NLF deals because of the 
lenders’ screening and monitoring role.  To test these hypotheses, we estimate OLS 
regressions of the following form: 
Yt+j = β0 + β1Loan Fin + β2 Yt−1 + ∑βi(deal characteristicsi ) +
∑β𝑗(acquirer characteristicsj ) + ∑β𝑘(other controlsk)                                            (2)                                                                                                              
In equation (2), the dependent variablesY𝑡+𝑗, where j=1,2 are the acquirers’ post-merger 
operating performance/creditworthiness representing unadjusted ROA𝑡+1  ROA𝑡+2 , 
Tobin′s Qt+1 , Tobin
′s Qt+2 , Z_Score𝑡+1 , Z_Score𝑡+2 , EDF𝑡+1  and EDF𝑡+2 . The 
lagged dependent variable, 𝑌𝑡−1 in year t-1 is included in the regression in order to 
control its effect on the post-merger operating performance/creditworthiness. Deal 
characteristics including transaction value, cash, combined and relative deal size, 
acquirer characteristics including total firm size, book- to-market ratio and leverage 
ratio and other variables including year and industry (SIC code) are controlled. The key 
variable of interest is the “Loan Fin” dummy. The coefficient, 𝛽1 of Loan Fin captures 
the difference in the dependent variable Y𝑡+𝑗 between acquirers of LF and NLF deals. 
In Table 3, columns (1) and (2) show the lenders’ monitoring effect on the acquirers’ 
post-merger ROA in year t+1 and t+2 respectively. We found statistically significant 
results that, after controlling the acquirers’ ROA in year t-1, deal characteristics, 
acquirer characteristics, and other variables, acquirers who have taken loans to finance 
their M&A deals have higher ROA than those who have not taken any loan (4.197% at 
5% level in year t+1 and 3.344% at 5% level in year t+2). Columns (3) and (4) show 
the lenders’ monitoring effect on the acquirers’ post-merger Altman’s Z-Score in year 
t+1 and t+2 respectively.  Consistently, we found statistically significant results that 
after controlling the acquirers’ Altman’s Z-Score in year t-1, deal characteristics, 
acquirer characteristics, and other variables, acquirers who have taken loans to finance 
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their M&A deals have a higher Z Score than those who have not taken any loan (0.076 
at 5% level in year t+1 and 0.131 at 1% level in year t+2). Columns (5) and (6) show 
the lenders’ monitoring effect on the acquirers’ post-merger EDF in year t+1 and t+2 
respectively.  Consistently, we found statistically significant results that after 
controlling the acquirers’ EDF in year t-1, deal characteristics, acquirer characteristics 
and other variables, acquirers who have taken loans to finance their M&A deals have 
lower EDF than those who have not taken any loan (-0.021 at 1% level in year t+1 and 
-0.028 at 1% level in year t+2).  
        Overall, our results support the hypothesis that lenders who have financed M&A 
deals have served their monitoring roles and lead to better post-merger operating 
performance and creditworthiness for the acquirers.  
5.2.2 Test of H2 
        Our H2 predicts that acquirers whose M&A deals are financed by relationship 
lenders will have better post-merger operating performance and creditworthiness than 
those financed by non-relationship lenders because of relationship lenders’ strong 
incentive to monitor. To test this hypothesis, we estimate OLS regressions of the 
following forms: 
Yt+j = β0 + β1Relationship + β2 Yt−1 + ∑βi(deal characteristicsi ) +
+∑βj(borrower characteristicsj ) + ∑βk(𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑘 ) +
∑β𝑙(other controlsl)                                                                                                             (3)     
                                                                                                              
In equation (3), the dependent variablesY𝑡+𝑗, where j=1,2 are the acquirers’ post-merger 
operating performance/creditworthiness representing unadjusted ROA𝑡+1 
ROA𝑡+2,Z_Score𝑡+1, Z_Score𝑡+2, EDF𝑡+1 and EDF𝑡+2. The lagged dependent variable, 
𝑌𝑡−1 in year t-1 is included in the regression in order to control its effect on the post-
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merger operating performance/creditworthiness. Deal characteristics including 
transaction value, cash, combined and relative deal size, borrower characteristics 
including total firm size, book to market ratio, leverage ratio, loan characteristics 
including financial covenant, total loan size year and maturity, and other variables 
including year and industry (SIC code) are controlled. The key variable of interest is 
the “Relationship” variable. The coefficient, 𝛽1 of Relationship captures the difference 
in the dependent variable Y𝑡+𝑗 between acquirers financed by relationship lenders and 
non-relationship lenders. In Table 4, columns (1) and (2) show relationship lenders’ 
stronger monitoring effect on the acquirers’ post-merger ROA in year t+1 and t+2 
respectively. We found statistically significant results that after controlling the acquirers’ 
ROA in year t-1, deal characteristics, borrower characteristics, loan characteristics and 
other variables, acquirers who have taken loans from relationship lenders have a higher 
ROA than those who have taken loans from non-relationship lenders (2.052% at 1% 
level in year t+1 and 1.361% at 10% level in year t+2). Columns (3) and (4) show that 
relationship lenders do not have a monitoring effect on the acquirers’ post-merger 
Altman’s Z Score in year t+1 and t+2 respectively. We found that after controlling the 
acquirers’ Altman’s Z Score in year t-1, deal characteristics, borrower characteristics, 
loan characteristics and other variables, taking loans from relationship lenders does not 
lead the acquirers to a better Z-Score than those who have taken loans from non-
relationship lenders because the coefficient 𝛽1 of relationship lenders are neither 
significant in year t+1 nor in year t+2. Column (5) shows relationships lenders’ stronger 
monitoring effect on the acquirers’ post-merger EDF in year t+1. We found statistically 
significant results that after controlling the acquirers’ EDF in year t-1, deal 
characteristics, borrower characteristics, loan characteristics and other variables, 
acquirers who have taken loans from relationship lenders have lower EDF than those 
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who have taken loans from non-relationship lenders (-0.022 at 5% level in year t+1). 
We also found that acquirers who have taken loans from relationship lenders have lower 
EDF in year t+2 but it is not statistically significant as shown in column (6). 
        Overall, the analysis above shows that relationship lenders have a stronger 
incentive to monitor the acquirers and lead to better post-merger operating performance 
and creditworthiness for them. 
5.2.3 Test of H3  
        In H3, we expect that acquirers whose M&A deals are financed by transactional 
lenders will have no impact on post-merger operating performance and 
creditworthiness because of transactional lenders’ weaker incentive to monitor. To test 
this hypothesis, we estimate OLS regressions of the following forms: 
Yt+j = β0 + β1Transactional + β2 Yt−1 + ∑βi(deal characteristicsi ) +
∑βj(borrower characteristicsj ) + ∑βk(𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑘 ) +
∑βl(other controlsl)                                                                                                             (4)        
                                                                                                           
In equation (4), the dependent variables Y𝑡+𝑗 , where j=1,2 are the acquirers’ post-merger 
operating performance/creditworthiness representing unadjusted ROA𝑡+1 ROA𝑡+2,Z Score𝑡+1, 
Z Score𝑡+2, EDF𝑡+1 and EDF𝑡+2. The lagged dependent variable, 𝑌𝑡−1 in year t-1 is included in 
the regression in order to control its effect on the post-merger operating 
performance/creditworthiness. Deal characteristics, borrower characteristics, loan 
characteristics, and other variables as described in 5.2.2 are controlled. The key variable of 
interest is the “Transactional” variable. The coefficient, 𝛽1  of Transactional captures the 
difference in the dependent variable Y𝑡+𝑗 between acquirers financed by transactional 
lenders and non-transactional lenders. In Table 5, column (1) and (2) show that 
transactional lenders do not have a monitoring effect on the acquirers’ post-merger ROA 
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in year t+1 and t+2 respectively. We found that after controlling the acquirers’ ROA in 
year t-1, deal characteristics, borrower characteristics, loan characteristics, and other 
variables, taking loans from transactional lenders does not have an impact on their ROA 
because the coefficient 𝛽1of transactional lenders are neither significant in year t+1 nor 
in year t+2. Columns (3) and (4) show that the transactional lenders do not have a 
monitoring effect on the acquirers’ post-merger Altman’s Z Score in year t+1 and t+2 
respectively. We found that after controlling the acquirers’ Altman’s Z Score in year t-
1, deal characteristics, borrower characteristics, loan characteristics, and other variables, 
taking loans from transactional lenders does not lead the acquirers to a different Z Score 
compared to those who have taken loans from non-transactional lenders because the 
coefficient 𝛽1of transactional lenders is significant neither in year t+1 nor in year t+2. 
Columns (5) and (6) show the transactional lenders do not have a monitoring effect on 
the acquirers’ post-merger EDF in year t+1 and t+2 respectively. We found that after 
controlling the acquirers’ EDF in year t-1, deal characteristics, borrower characteristics, 
loan characteristics, and other variables, taking loans from transactional lenders does 
not lead the acquirers to different EDF compared to those who have taken loans from 
non-transactional lenders because the coefficient 𝛽1 of transactional lenders is 
significant neither in year t+1 nor in year t+2. 
        Our results support the hypothesis that transactional lenders who have financed 
M&A deals have a weaker monitoring incentive and have no impact on post-merger 
operating performance and creditworthiness for the acquirers. 
5.2.4 Test of H4 
        We also expect that acquirers whose M&A deals are financed by institutional 
lenders will have worse post-merger operating performance and creditworthiness than 
those financed by non-institutional lenders because institutional lenders’ are 
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uninformed investors and possess a very weak incentive to monitor. To test this 
hypothesis, we estimate OLS regressions of the following forms: 
Yt+j = β0 + β1Institutional + β2 Yt−1 + ∑βi(deal characteristicsi ) +
∑βj(borrower characteristicsj ) + ∑βk(𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑘 ) +
∑βl(other controlsl)                                                                                                          (5)                                                                                                                  
 
In equation (5), the dependent variablesY𝑡+𝑗, where j=1,2 are the acquirers’ post-merger 
operating performance/creditworthiness representing unadjusted ROA𝑡+1 
ROA𝑡+2,Z Score𝑡+1, Z Score𝑡+2, 𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑡+1 and 𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑡+2. The lagged dependent variable, 
𝑌𝑡−1 in year t-1 is included in the regression in order to control its effect on the post-
merger operating performance/creditworthiness. Deal characteristics, borrower 
characteristics, loan characteristics and other variables as described in 5.2.2 are 
controlled. The key variable of interest is the “Institutional” variable. The coefficient, 
𝛽1  of Institutional captures the difference in the dependent variable Y𝑡+𝑗  between 
acquirers financed by institutional lenders and non-institutional lenders. In Table 6, 
columns (1) and (2) show institutional lenders’ weak monitoring effect on the acquirers’ 
post-merger ROA in year t+1 and t+2 respectively. We found statistically significant 
results that after controlling the acquirers’ ROA in year t-1, deal characteristics, 
borrower characteristics, loan characteristics, and other variables, acquirers who have 
taken loans from institutional lenders have lower ROA than those who have taken loans 
from non-institutional lenders (-2.948% at 1% level in year t+1 and -3.566% at 1% 
level in year t+2). Columns (3) and (4) show the institutional lenders’ monitoring does 
not have a monitoring effect on the acquirers’ post-merger Altman’s Z Score in year t+1 
and t+2 respectively. We found that after controlling the acquirers’ Altman’s Z Score 
in year t-1, deal characteristics, borrower characteristics, loan characteristics and other 
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variables, taking loans from institutional lenders do not lead the acquirers to worse Z 
Scores than those who have taken loans from non-institutional lenders because the 
coefficient 𝛽1of institutional lenders are neither significant in year t+1 nor in year t+2. 
Columns (5) shows institutional lenders’ weak monitoring effect on the acquirers’ post-
merger EDF in year t+1. We found statistically significant results that after controlling 
the acquirers’ EDF in year t-1, deal characteristics, borrower characteristics, loan 
characteristics and other variables, acquirers who have taken loans from institutional 
lenders have higher EDF than those who have taken loans from non-institutional 
lenders (0.056 at 1% level in year t+1). We also found that acquirers who have taken 
loans from institutional lenders have higher EDF in year t+2 but it is not statistically 
significant as shown in column (6). 
        The findings on ROA and EDF support the hypothesis that institutional lenders 
who have financed M&A deals are uninformed investors and have a very weak 
monitoring incentive, and will lead to worse post-merger operating performance and 
creditworthiness for the acquirers. However, the findings on Altman’s Z Score do not 
support the hypothesis that institutional lenders who have financed M&A deals will 
lead to worse post-merger creditworthiness for the acquirers. 
5.2.5 Test of H5 
        We hypothesize that acquirers whose M&A deals are financed by reputable lenders 
will have better post-merger operating performance and creditworthiness than those 
financed by non-reputable lenders because of relationship lenders’ strong incentive to 
monitor in H5. To test this hypothesis, we estimate OLS regressions of the following 
forms: 
Yt+j = β0 + β1Reputable + β2 Yt−1 + ∑βi(deal characteristicsi ) +
∑βj(borrower characteristicsj ) + ∑βk(𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑘 ) +
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∑β𝑙(other controlsl)                                                                                                            (6)                                                                                                                          
 
In equation (6), the dependent variablesY𝑡+𝑗, where j=1,2 are the acquirers’ post-merger 
operating performance/creditworthiness representing unadjusted ROA𝑡+1 , 
ROA𝑡+2,Z Score𝑡+1, Z Score𝑡+2, EDF𝑡+1 and EDF𝑡+2. The lagged dependent variable, 
𝑌𝑡−1 in year t-1 is included in the regression in order to control its effect on the post-
merger operating performance/creditworthiness. Deal characteristics, borrower 
characteristics, loan characteristics and other variables as described in 5.2.2 are 
controlled. The key variable of interest is the “Reputable” variable. The coefficient, 
𝛽1  of Reputable captures the difference in the dependent variable Y𝑡+𝑗  between 
acquirers financed by reputable lenders and non-reputable lenders. In Table 7, columns 
(1) and (2) show relationship lenders’ stronger monitoring effect on the acquirers’ post-
merger ROA in year t+1 and t+2 respectively. We found statistically significant results 
that after controlling the acquirers’ ROA in year t-1, deal characteristics, borrower 
characteristics, loan characteristics and other variables, acquirers who have taken loans 
from reputable lenders have higher ROA than those who have taken loans from non-
reputable lenders (2.176% at 1% level in year t+1 and 1.637% at 5% level in year t+2). 
Column (3) shows the reputable lenders’ stronger monitoring effect on the acquirers’ 
post-merger Altman’s Z Score in year t+1. We found statistically significant results that 
after controlling the acquirers’ Altman’s Z Score in year t-1, deal characteristics, 
borrower characteristics, loan characteristics and other variables, acquirers who have 
taken loans from reputable lenders have higher Z Score than those who have taken loans 
from non-relationship lenders (0.072 at 10% level in year t+1). We also found that 
acquirers who have taken loans from reputable lenders have higher Z-Scores in year 
t+2 but it is not statistically significant as shown in column (4). Columns (5) and (6) 
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show relationship lenders’ stronger monitoring effect on the acquirers’ post-merger 
EDF in year t+1 and t+2 respectively. We found statistically significant results that after 
controlling the acquirers’ EDF in year t-1, deal characteristics, borrower characteristics, 
loan characteristics and other variables, acquirers who have taken loans from reputable 
lenders have lower EDF than those who have taken loans from non-reputable lenders 
(-0.036 at 1% level in year t+1 and -0.039 at 1% level in year t+2). 
        Overall, the analysis above shows that reputable lenders have a very strong 
incentive to monitor the acquirers, which leads to better post-merger operating 
performance and creditworthiness for them. 
5.3 Robustness check  
5.3.1 PSM (Propensity score matching) 
        For H1, we need to separate selection effects from the treatment effects of taking 
syndicated loans. Since an acquirer’s decision to take a syndicated loan is likely to be 
related to the acquirer’s characteristics and the M&A deal characteristics, comparing 
pairwise matched firms (i.e., two firms in each pair with similar observable 
characteristics, one takes syndicated loans and the other does not) represents a robust 
estimate of the effects of syndicated loans on the outcome variables (ROA, Altman’s Z 
Score and EDF). We apply the PSM (propensity score matching) technique (Heckman, 
Ichimura, & Todd, 1997, 1998) to match LF deals with NLF deals based on observable 
acquirer characteristics and deal characteristics. We use the following probit model to 
estimate the propensity score with deal characteristics including transaction value, cash, 
combined and relative deal size, acquirer characteristics including total firm size, book to 
market ratio and leverage ratio, and other variables including year and industry (SIC code).  
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑓𝑖𝑛 = ∑βi(deal characteristicsi ) + ∑β𝑗(acquirer characteristicsj ) +
∑β𝑘(other controlsk)                                                                                                                (7)                                                                                                              
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The dependent variable is a binary choice variable “Loan fin” which takes the value of 
1 if the M&A deal is LF or 0 otherwise. Based on this probit model, we first estimate 
the predicted probabilities of taking syndicated loans for each M&A deal and use them 
as propensity scores. Then, we apply one-to-one matching without replacement to find 
LF and NLF pairwise matched loans with the difference in propensity scores smaller 
than 1% (i.e., caliper = 0.01). Panel A in Table 8 reports the mean differences in the 
outcome variables between LF and NLF deals by using PSM to match them. Mostly 
onsistent with the results reported in Table 3, the results in Panel A Table 8 suggest that 
LF deals have higher ROA, higher Altman’s Z Score in year t+1 and t+2 and lower 
EDF in year t+1 compared to those of matched NLF deals. 
        For H2, H3, H4 and H5, we use PSM as an alternative approach to address the 
possible selection bias arising from the observable characteristics among acquirers who 
take syndicated loans from different type of lenders. The probit model to estimate 
propensity score is similar to equation (7) except that we use “Relationship”, 
“Transactional”, “Institutional” and “Reputable” as the dependent variables for H2, H3, 
H4 and H5 respectively, and that we add loan characteristics including financial 
covenant, total loan size year and maturity. Panel B in Table 8 suggests that M&A deals 
financed by relationship lenders have higher ROA, higher Altman’s Z Score and lower 
EDF compared to those of matched M&A deals financed by non-relationship lenders 
in year t+1 and t+2 (the results are all significant at least at 10% level) which is 
consistent with the results reported in Table 4. Panel C in Table 8 suggests that 
transactional lenders have no impact on post-merger ROA, Altman’s Z Score and EDF 
for the acquirers in year t+1 and t+2 which is mostly consistent with Table 5. Panel D 
in Table 8 shows mixed results. Consistent with Table 6, M&A deals financed by 
institutional lenders have lower Altman’s Z-Score in year t+1 and t+2 (significant at 
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least at 5% level). However, institutional lenders have no impact on post-merger ROA 
and EDF for the acquirer in year t+1 and t+2. Panel E in Table 8 suggests that M&A 
deals financed by reputable lenders have higher ROA, higher Altman’s Z Score and 
lower EDF compared to those of matched M&A deals financed by non-relationship 
lenders in year t+1 and t+2 (the results are all significant 1% level) which provide 
stronger support to H5 compared to the results reported in Table 7. 
5.3.2 Industry-adjusted performance and creditworthiness 
        The other robustness check is to calculate industry-adjusted ROA, Altman’s Z 
Score and EDF by calculating the difference between the unadjusted ROA, Altman’s Z 
Score and EDF and their respective median values of the firms in the industry with the 
same first two digits of SIC codes, and then run regressions to test H1, H2, H3, H4 and 
H5 to compare the results with those of unadjusted ROA, Altman’s Z Score and EDF. 
Industry-adjusted measures make the results more robust because they take into account 
of the first two digits of the SIC code rather than just the first digit of the SIC code as 
in the case of firm fixed effect in the regressions to test unadjusted measures. 
        Table 9 presents the summary statistics of acquirers’ industry-adjusted operating 
performance, industry-adjusted creditworthiness, acquirer characteristics and deal 
characteristics. Amongst the sample M&A deals, we classify them as either NLF or LF. 
The summary statistics of the whole sample, NLF and LF M&A deals are reported from 
Panel A to C.  In addition, we also reported the means of different dimensions of the 
whole sample, NLF and LF M&A deals and their difference in Panel D. The means of 
LF deals are significantly different from NLF deals in all dimensions except 𝐸𝐷𝐹𝐼𝐴𝑡−1. 
The differences between the industry-adjusted means of acquirers in NLF deals and 
those in LF deals exhibit nearly the same pattern as the differences between unadjusted 
means. Industry-adjusted means are lower than unadjusted means.  
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        Table 10 presents the regression results of industry-adjusted performance and 
industry-adjusted creditworthiness. For economy of space, we only report the 
coefficients, standard error and significance level of the key variable of interest, as well 
as the fits of regression models. Panel A of Table 10 suggests that acquirers of LF deals 
have higher ROA in year t+1, higher Altman’s Z Score in year t+2 and lower EDF in 
year t+1 and t+2 (significant at least at 5% level). However, ROA in year t+1 and EDF 
in year t+2 do not differ. Panel B of Table 10 suggests that acquirers financed by 
relationship lenders have higher ROA in year t+1 and t+2 and lower EDF in year t+1, 
which is consistent with the results in Table 4. However, Altman’s Z Score in year t+1 
and t+2 and EDF in year t+2 do not differ. Panel C of Table 10 suggests that acquirers 
financed by transactional lenders do not differ on ROA, Altman’s Z Score and EDF in 
year t+1 and t+2, which is consistent with the results in Table 5. Panel D of Table 10 
suggests that acquirers financed by institutional lenders have lower ROA in year t+1 
and t+2 (significant at least at 5% level), have higher EDF in year t+1 and do not differ 
on Altman’s Z Score in year t+1 and t+2, which is consistent with the results in Table 
6. However, EDF in year t+2 do not differ. Panel E of Table 10 suggests that acquirers 
financed by reputable lenders have higher ROA in year t+1 and t+2 and lower EDF  in 
year t+1 and t+2 (significant at least at 10% level). However, they do not differ on 
Altman’s Z Score in year t+1 and t+2.  
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6. Further research 
        Having used M&A as an avenue to explore the impact of taking syndicated loans 
from different types of lenders on the borrower’s post-event performance, it is 
worthwhile to use IPO as the other avenue because more than one fourth of IPO firms 
raise capital by taking syndicated loans prior to IPO (Bouwman & Lowry, 2013). It is 
worthwhile to look into this and the results may shed light on financial institutions 
specialness and IPO long-run underperformance. We expect that: (1) IPO firms who 
have taken syndicated loans from relationship lenders prior to the IPO will have better 
post-IPO financing certainty, operating performance and creditworthiness; (2) IPO 
firms who have taken syndicated loans from reputable lenders prior to the IPO will have 
better post-IPO financing certainty, operating performance and creditworthiness; (3) 
IPO firms who have taken syndicated loans from institutional lenders prior to the IPO 
will have worse post-IPO financing certainty, operating performance and 
creditworthiness, and; (4) IPO firms who have taken syndicated loans from 
transactional lenders prior to the IPO will not differ on post-IPO financing certainty, 
operating performance and creditworthiness. 
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7. Limitations 
        In addition to examining ROA as the measure of post-merger performance, we 
have also examined buy-and-hold abnormal returns (hereinafter referred to as BHARs) 
and Tobin’s Q. We found that the key variable of interests does impact BHARs to the 
same direction as ROA but most of the results are not significant. We found that 
relationship lenders, institutional lenders and reputable lenders have statistically 
significant impact on Tobin’s Q in year t+1 and t+2 similar to that on ROA and that 
transactional lenders do not impact Tobin’s Q in year t+1 and t+2 similar to that on 
ROA. However, we also found that taking a syndicated loan lowers Tobin’s Q after 
merger in year t+1 and t+2 which is different from ROA. We are not able to address the 
reason at this point. But we will explore the reason in the future and this will be an 
interesting direction for further research. 
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8. Conclusion 
        Given that different lender types (relationship lender, transactional lender, 
institutional lender and reputable lender), in the syndicated loan market have different 
incentives to monitor their respective borrowers and different purposes to engage in 
syndicated loans, we have examined whether different lender types monitor corporate 
decisions to an extent that will lead to different post-merger operating performance and 
mitigate post-merger underperformance problems in many M&A deals. We found that 
relationship lenders have a stronger incentive to monitor the acquirers and lead to better 
post-merger operating performance (ROA) and creditworthiness (EDF) for the 
acquirers, that transactional lenders with weaker monitoring incentives have no impact 
on the acquirers’ post-merger operating performance (ROA) and creditworthiness 
(Altman’s Z Score and EDF), that institutional lenders as uninformed investors with 
very weak monitoring incentives lead to worse post-merger operating performance 
(ROA) and worse creditworthiness (EDF) for the acquirers, and that reputable lenders 
with a strong incentive to monitor the acquirers lead to better post-merger operating 
performance (ROA) and creditworthiness (Altman’s Z Score and EDF) for them. We 
also examined whether lenders, regardless of their lender types, generally monitor 
corporate decisions to an extent that will lead to better post-merger operating 
performance and creditworthiness. We found that the acquirers of loan-financed M&A 
deals experience better performance and creditworthiness compared to those of non-
loan-financed M&A deals. We have also done robustness checks including propensity 
score matching and industry-adjusted measurements. In all the results of the regressions 
using unadjusted measures and the two robustness checks, we found that acquirers who 
have taken syndicated loans have better ROA and EDF in year t+1 and better Altman’s 
Z Score in year t+2 which means taking syndicated loans is beneficial for shareholders 
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and debtholders, that acquirers who have taken syndicated loans from relationship 
lenders have better ROA in year t+1 and t+2 and better EDF in year t+1 which means 
taking syndicated loans from relationship lenders is beneficial for shareholders and 
debtholders, that acquirers who have taken syndicated loans from transactional lenders 
do not differ on ROA, Altman’s Z Score and EDF in year t+1 and t+2 which means 
taking syndicated loans from transactional lenders is neither beneficial nor harmful to 
shareholders and debtholders, and that acquirers who have taken loans from reputable 
lenders have better ROA in year t+1 and t+2 and better EDF in year t+1 which means 
taking syndicated loans from reputable lenders is beneficial for shareholders and 
debtholders.  
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Table 1. M&A deals and loan lender type distribution by year 
This table summarizes the M&A deals distribution by year. Total deal no. is the total number of loan-
financed and non-loan-financed M&A deals in the year. Non-loan-fin no. is the number of non-loan-
financed M&A deals in the year. Loan-fin no. is the number of loan-financed M&A deals in the year.  
Panel A (M&A deals distribution by year) 
Year Total deal no. Non-loan-fin no. Loan-fin no. 
2005 783 315 468 
2006 788 319 469 
2007 753 301 452 
2008 571 212 359 
2009 424 169 255 
2010 504 174 330 
2011 132 49 83 
Total 3,955 1539 2416 
 
Panel B (Participation intensity of different lenders’ distribution by year) 
  Participation Intensity 
Year Relationship Transactional Institutional Reputable 
2005 0.58 0.51 0.08 0.61 
2006 0.56 0.57 0.10 0.66 
2007 0.58 0.58 0.11 0.68 
2008 0.53 0.53 0.11 0.70 
2009 0.60 0.56 0.10 0.74 
2010 0.52 0.54 0.09 0.80 
2011 0.34 0.46 0.07 0.77 
Mean 0.53 0.54 0.10 0.71 
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Table 2. Summary statistics – Unadjusted acquirers performance, 
creditworthiness and characteristics and deal characteristics 
The M&A sample consists of M&A deals whose acquirers are U.S. firms and transaction values are at 
least $1 million dollars announced in the period from 1 January, 2005 to 31 December, 2011.  
ROA𝑡−1  is the acquirer’s ROA in the year before the M&A deal’s announcement date.   
Z_Score𝑡−1is the acquirer’s Altman’s Z-score in the year before the M&A deal’s announcement date 
calculated by excluding term X4. EDF𝑡−1 is the acquirer’s EDF in the year before the M&A deal’s 
announcement date. ROA𝑡+1, Z_Score𝑡+1 and EDF𝑡+1 represent the acquirer’s ROA, Z-score and EDF 
one year after the M&A deal’s announcement year. ROA𝑡+2,  Z_Score𝑡+2  and EDF𝑡+2  represent the 
acquirer’s ROA, Z-score and EDF two years after the M&A deal’s announcement year. Total loan size is 
defined as the natural logarithm of total size of the loan plus 1 million. Total firm size is defined as the 
natural logarithm of total asset of the acquirer plus 1 million. Book-to-market is the ratio of the acquirer’s 
book value equity to its market value equity. Leverage is the ratio of the acquirer’s total long term debt 
to its total asset. Transaction value is defined as the natural logarithm of the M&A deal’s transaction 
value. Relative deal size is the ratio of the value of the M&A transaction to the acquirer’s total asset. 
Cash is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the M&A deal’s payment method is 100% by cash and 0 
otherwise. Combined is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the M&A deal’s payment method is by cash 
plus stock and 0 otherwise. Detailed variables definition can be found in Appendix A. The data for total 
loan size, total firm size, book-to-market, leverage, transaction value and relative deal size are winsorized 
at 1 percentile and 99 percentile. Levels of statistical significance of the difference between non-loan-
financed and loan-financed at 10%, 5% and 1% are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
Panel A (Unadjusted: Loan-financed and non-loan-financed) 
  N Mean S.D. P25 Median P75 
ROA𝑡−1 3885 1.93 19.87 0.94 4.12 8.05 
Z Score𝑡−1 2997 1.36 1.84 0.68 1.60 2.42 
EDF𝑡−1 3172 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ROA𝑡+1 3955 -2.05 47.17 -0.02 3.03 6.87 
Z Score𝑡+1 3055 1.22 1.79 0.58 1.48 2.26 
EDF𝑡+1 3328 0.07 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ROA𝑡+2 3955 -3.37 45.83 -1.01 2.60 6.33 
Z − Score𝑡+2 3054 1.17 1.83 0.54 1.45 2.22 
EDF𝑡+2 2878 0.10 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Total firm size 3891 6.88 2.12 5.47 6.82 8.16 
Book-to-market 3723 0.53 0.40 0.28 0.45 0.68 
Leverage 3874 0.19 0.20 0.01 0.13 0.30 
Transaction value 3955 4.03 1.88 2.70 3.96 5.30 
Cash 3955 0.38 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Combined 3955 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Relative deal size 3891 0.22 0.46 0.02 0.06 0.20 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
Panel B (Unadjusted: Non-loan-financed) 
  N Mean S.D. P25 Median P75 
ROA𝑡−1 1476 -2.59 28.69 -0.96 1.65 6.69 
Z Score𝑡−1 1081 0.53 2.32 -0.66 1.02 2.06 
EDF𝑡−1 992 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ROA𝑡+1 1539 -10.07 73.76 -5.15 0.94 5.26 
Z Score𝑡+1 1130 0.42 2.20 -0.65 0.90 1.93 
EDF𝑡+1 1124 0.08 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.01 
ROA𝑡+2 1539 -11.58 70.81 -6.07 0.86 4.94 
Z − Score𝑡+2 1131 0.36 2.27 -0.81 0.88 1.89 
EDF𝑡+2 997 0.13 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.07 
Total firm size 1480 5.81 2.07 4.32 5.65 6.97 
Book-to-market 1393 0.55 0.43 0.27 0.46 0.72 
Leverage 1470 0.11 0.18 0.00 0.03 0.15 
Transaction value 1539 3.32 1.70 2.08 3.23 4.40 
Cash 1539 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Combined 1539 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Relative deal size 1480 0.30 0.58 0.03 0.09 0.29 
 
Panel C (Unadjusted: Loan-financed) 
  N Mean S.D. P25 Median P75 
ROA𝑡−1 2409 4.70 10.59 1.97 4.95 8.46 
Z Score𝑡−1 1916 1.83 1.28 1.07 1.85 2.58 
EDF𝑡−1 2180 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ROA𝑡+1 2416 3.06 10.56 1.12 4.14 7.48 
Z Score𝑡+1 1925 1.70 1.27 0.96 1.72 2.40 
EDF𝑡+1 2204 0.06 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ROA𝑡+2 2416 1.86 13.24 0.55 3.70 6.83 
Z − Score𝑡+2 1923 1.65 1.28 0.92 1.67 2.37 
EDF𝑡+2 1881 0.08 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Total firm size 2411 7.54 1.86 6.30 7.39 8.67 
Book-to-market 2330 0.52 0.38 0.28 0.45 0.66 
Leverage 2404 0.24 0.20 0.07 0.20 0.36 
Transaction value 2416 4.49 1.84 3.14 4.44 5.75 
Cash 2416 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Combined 2416 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Relative deal size 2411 0.17 0.37 0.02 0.05 0.16 
5
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Table 3. OLS regressions – Unadjusted acquirers’ post-merger operating 
performance (H1) 
This table analyzes the acquirers’ post-merger operating performance after taking syndicated loans using 
OLS regressions. The subscripts t-1, t+1 and t+2 denote the year prior to the merger, one year and two 
year after the merger, respectively. The dependent variables in Column (1) - (6) are ROA at t +1, ROA 
at t + 2, Altman's Z Score at t + 1, Altman's Z Score at t + 2, EDF at t + 1 and EDF at t + 2 respectively. 
The year fixed effects and 1-digit industry fixed effects are controlled for in the regressions. Detailed 
variables definition can be found in Appendix A. Standard errors are calculated at firm level and reported 
in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% are indicated by *, ** and *** 
respectively. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Regression 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝒕+𝟏 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝒕+𝟐 𝐙 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝒕+𝟏 𝐙 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝒕+𝟐 𝐄𝐃𝐅𝒕+𝟏 𝐄𝐃𝐅𝒕+𝟐 
Variables Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Loan Fin  4.197** 3.344** 0.076** 0.131*** -0.021*** -0.028*** 
 [1.741] [1.623] [0.036] [0.043] [0.008] [0.010] 
ROA𝑡−1 0.935*** 0.775***     
 [0.040] [0.037]     
Z Score𝑡−1   0.846*** 0.818***   
   [0.009] [0.011]   
EDF𝑡−1     0.054* 0.094** 
     [0.028] [0.037] 
Total firm size 0.347 0.989* 0.051*** 0.046*** 0.001 -0.006* 
 [0.579] [0.539] [0.012] [0.014] [0.003] [0.003] 
Book-to-market -5.814*** -0.831 -0.111*** -0.148*** 0.040*** 0.058*** 
 [1.900] [1.771] [0.038] [0.045] [0.009] [0.013] 
Leverage -6.406 -0.457 0.050 -0.040 0.124*** 0.122*** 
 [3.954] [3.685] [0.082] [0.098] [0.017] [0.023] 
Transaction value 0.941 0.727 -0.047*** -0.035** -0.007*** -0.003 
 [0.604] [0.563] [0.012] [0.014] [0.003] [0.004] 
Cash 6.395* 7.993** 0.071 0.087 0.005 0.010 
 [3.381] [3.151] [0.074] [0.087] [0.015] [0.020] 
Combined 6.389* 6.884** 0.043 0.075 0.004 0.015 
 [3.275] [3.052] [0.072] [0.085] [0.014] [0.019] 
Relative deal size -10.091*** -7.549*** 0.042 0.064 0.051*** 0.032** 
 [2.132] [1.987] [0.040] [0.048] [0.011] [0.014] 
       
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Obs. 3,716 3,716 2,874 2,866 2,962 2,518 
R-Squared 0.197 0.172 0.825 0.763 0.245 0.224 
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Table 4. OLS regressions – Unadjusted acquirers’ post-merger operating 
performance (H2) 
This table analyzes the acquirers’ post-merger operating performance after taking syndicated loans from 
relationship lenders using OLS regressions. The subscripts t-1, t+1 and t+2 denote the year prior to the 
merger, one year and two year after the merger, respectively. The dependent variables in Column (1) - (6) 
are ROA at t +1, ROA at t + 2, Altman's Z Score at t + 1, Altman's Z Score at t + 2, EDF at t + 1 and 
EDF at t + 2 respectively. The year fixed effects and 1-digit industry fixed effects are controlled for in 
the regressions. Detailed variables definition can be found in Appendix A. Standard errors are calculated 
at firm level and reported in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% are 
indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Regression 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝒕+𝟏 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝒕+𝟐 𝐙 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝒕+𝟏 𝐙 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝒕+𝟐 𝐄𝐃𝐅𝒕+𝟏 𝐄𝐃𝐅𝒕+𝟐 
Variables Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Relationship 2.052*** 1.361* 0.063 0.067 -0.022** -0.012 
 [0.605] [0.762] [0.040] [0.046] [0.010] [0.014] 
ROA𝑡−1 0.214*** 0.216***     
 [0.021] [0.026]     
Z Score𝑡−1   0.838*** 0.804***   
   [0.013] [0.015]   
EDF𝑡−1     0.051 0.067 
     [0.032] [0.041] 
Fcovenant 0.142 0.164 0.011 0.005 -0.013 -0.022** 
 [0.463] [0.584] [0.031] [0.035] [0.008] [0.011] 
Total loan size 0.153 0.460 -0.010 0.009 -0.002 -0.013** 
 [0.237] [0.299] [0.017] [0.020] [0.004] [0.005] 
Maturity -0.020 0.068 0.011 0.003 -0.005 -0.002 
 [0.340] [0.428] [0.023] [0.026] [0.006] [0.008] 
Total firm size -0.156 0.142 0.013 -0.010 0.008** 0.011** 
 [0.241] [0.304] [0.018] [0.021] [0.004] [0.005] 
Book-to-
market 
-
5.340*** 
-5.864*** -0.149*** -0.148*** 
0.053**
* 
0.066*** 
 [0.585] [0.737] [0.041] [0.046] [0.011] [0.015] 
Leverage -2.921** -1.913 0.073 -0.062 
0.119**
* 
0.139*** 
 [1.246] [1.570] [0.093] [0.106] [0.021] [0.028] 
Transaction 
value 
0.364** 0.017 -0.013 0.002 
-
0.011**
* 
-0.008** 
 [0.182] [0.230] [0.012] [0.014] [0.003] [0.004] 
Cash 1.644 -0.163 0.251*** 0.176* 0.002 0.061** 
 [1.208] [1.522] [0.086] [0.098] [0.020] [0.027] 
Combined 1.986* -0.191 0.255*** 0.221** -0.004 0.057** 
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 [1.186] [1.494] [0.085] [0.097] [0.020] [0.026] 
Relative deal 
size 
-
3.931*** 
-1.327 -0.389*** -0.409*** 
0.090**
* 
0.090*** 
 [0.975] [1.229] [0.064] [0.073] [0.017] [0.022] 
       
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Obs. 2,278 2,278 1,823 1,818 2,027 1,713 
R-Squared 0.161 0.123 0.795 0.742 0.250 0.235 
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Table 5. OLS regressions – Unadjusted acquirers’ post-merger operating 
performance (H3) 
This table analyzes the acquirers’ post-merger operating performance after taking syndicated loans from 
transactional lenders using OLS regressions. The subscripts t-1, t+1 and t+2 denote the year prior to the 
merger, one year and two year after the merger, respectively. The dependent variables in Column (1) - (6) 
are ROA at t +1, ROA at t + 2, Altman's Z Score at t + 1, Altman's Z Score at t + 2, EDF at t + 1 and 
EDF at t + 2 respectively. The year fixed effects and 1-digit industry fixed effects are controlled for in 
the regressions. Detailed variables definition can be found in Appendix A. Standard errors are calculated 
at firm level and reported in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% are 
indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Regression 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝒕+𝟏 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝒕+𝟐 𝐙 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝒕+𝟏 𝐙 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝒕+𝟐 𝐄𝐃𝐅𝒕+𝟏 𝐄𝐃𝐅𝒕+𝟐 
Variables Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Transactional -0.057 -0.186 0.043 -0.010 0.004 -0.003 
 [0.610] [0.768] [0.040] [0.046] [0.010] [0.014] 
ROA𝑡−1 0.217*** 0.218***     
 [0.021] [0.026]     
Z Score𝑡−1   0.842*** 0.806***   
   [0.013] [0.015]   
EDF𝑡−1     0.055* 0.069* 
     [0.032] [0.041] 
Fcovenant 0.173 0.195 0.009 0.007 -0.013* -0.022** 
 [0.467] [0.587] [0.031] [0.035] [0.008] [0.011] 
Total loan size 0.397* 0.633** -0.006 0.016 -0.005 -0.014*** 
 [0.232] [0.291] [0.017] [0.019] [0.004] [0.005] 
Maturity -0.018 0.078 0.008 0.003 -0.005 -0.001 
 [0.342] [0.431] [0.023] [0.026] [0.006] [0.008] 
Total firm size -0.166 0.142 0.011 -0.009 0.008** 0.011** 
 [0.243] [0.306] [0.018] [0.021] [0.004] [0.005] 
Book-to-
market 
-5.386*** -5.889*** -0.151*** -0.148*** 0.054*** 0.066*** 
 [0.587] [0.738] [0.041] [0.046] [0.011] [0.015] 
Leverage -2.836** -1.812 0.069 -0.049 0.117*** 0.139*** 
 [1.262] [1.588] [0.094] [0.107] [0.022] [0.028] 
Transaction 
value 
0.393** 0.038 -0.013 0.003 -0.011*** -0.008** 
 [0.183] [0.230] [0.012] [0.014] [0.003] [0.004] 
Cash 1.628 -0.162 0.251*** 0.181* 0.001 0.061** 
 [1.212] [1.525] [0.086] [0.098] [0.020] [0.027] 
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Combined 1.954 -0.202 0.255*** 0.225** -0.004 0.057** 
 [1.190] [1.497] [0.085] [0.097] [0.020] [0.026] 
Relative deal 
size 
-4.098*** -1.428 -0.397*** -0.413*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 
 [0.977] [1.229] [0.064] [0.073] [0.017] [0.022] 
       
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Obs. 2,278 2,278 1,823 1,818 2,027 1,713 
R-Squared 0.157 0.122 0.795 0.742 0.248 0.235 
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Table 6. OLS regressions – Unadjusted acquirers’ post-merger operating 
performance (H4) 
This table analyzes the acquirers’ post-merger operating performance after taking syndicated loans from 
institutional lenders using the OLS regressions. The subscripts t-1, t+1 and t+2 denote the year prior to 
the merger, one year and two year after the merger, respectively. The dependent variables in Column (1) 
- (6) are ROA at t +1, ROA at t + 2, Altman's Z Score at t + 1, Altman's Z Score at t + 2, EDF at t + 1 
and EDF at t + 2 respectively. The year fixed effects and 1-digit industry fixed effects are controlled for 
in the regressions. Detailed variables definition can be found in Appendix A. Standard errors are 
calculated at firm level and reported in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Regression 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝒕+𝟏 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝒕+𝟐 𝐙 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝒕+𝟏 𝐙 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝒕+𝟐 𝐄𝐃𝐅𝒕+𝟏 𝐄𝐃𝐅𝒕+𝟐 
Variables Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Institutional -2.948*** -3.566*** -0.000 -0.064 0.056*** 0.026 
 [1.020] [1.283] [0.068] [0.077] [0.017] [0.023] 
ROA𝑡−1 0.215*** 0.215***     
 [0.021] [0.026]     
Z Score𝑡−1   0.841*** 0.805***   
   [0.013] [0.015]   
EDF𝑡−1     0.050 0.067 
     [0.032] [0.041] 
Fcovenant 0.150 0.160 0.012 0.007 -0.013 -0.023** 
 [0.464] [0.583] [0.031] [0.035] [0.008] [0.011] 
Total loan size 0.421* 0.653** -0.003 0.017 -0.006 
-
0.014*** 
 [0.227] [0.285] [0.017] [0.019] [0.004] [0.005] 
Maturity 0.172 0.301 0.010 0.006 -0.009 -0.003 
 [0.346] [0.436] [0.023] [0.026] [0.006] [0.008] 
Total firm size -0.180 0.119 0.013 -0.012 0.009** 0.011** 
 [0.241] [0.304] [0.018] [0.021] [0.004] [0.005] 
Book-to-
market 
-5.467*** -5.991*** -0.150*** -0.150*** 0.056*** 0.067*** 
 [0.586] [0.737] [0.041] [0.046] [0.011] [0.015] 
Leverage -1.779 -0.568 0.083 -0.022 0.098*** 0.129*** 
 [1.300] [1.636] [0.099] [0.112] [0.022] [0.029] 
Transaction 
value 
0.377** 0.017 -0.012 0.003 
-
0.010*** 
-0.008** 
 [0.182] [0.229] [0.012] [0.014] [0.003] [0.004] 
Cash 1.585 -0.224 0.254*** 0.181* 0.003 0.061** 
 [1.209] [1.521] [0.086] [0.098] [0.020] [0.027] 
Combined 1.858 -0.327 0.257*** 0.224** -0.002 0.057** 
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 [1.187] [1.493] [0.085] [0.097] [0.020] [0.026] 
Relative deal 
size 
-3.959*** -1.268 -0.394*** -0.411*** 0.088*** 0.090*** 
 [0.976] [1.227] [0.064] [0.073] [0.017] [0.022] 
       
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Obs. 2,278 2,278 1,823 1,818 2,027 1,713 
R-Squared 0.160 0.125 0.795 0.742 0.252 0.236 
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Table 7. OLS regressions – Unadjusted acquirers’ post-merger operating 
performance (H5) 
This table analyzes the acquirers’ post-merger operating performance after taking syndicated loans from 
reputable lenders using OLS regressions. The subscripts t-1, t+1 and t+2 denote the year prior to the 
merger, one year and two year after the merger, respectively. The dependent variables in Column (1) - (6) 
are ROA at t +1, ROA at t + 2, Altman's Z Score at t + 1, Altman's Z Score at t + 2, EDF at t + 1 and 
EDF at t + 2 respectively. The year fixed effects and 1-digit industry fixed effects are controlled for in 
the regressions. Detailed variables definition can be found in Appendix A. Standard errors are calculated 
at firm level and reported in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% are 
indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Regression 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝒕+𝟏 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝒕+𝟐 𝐙 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝒕+𝟏 𝐙 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝒕+𝟐 𝐄𝐃𝐅𝒕+𝟏 𝐄𝐃𝐅𝒕+𝟐 
Variables Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Reputable 2.176*** 1.637** 0.072* 0.054 -0.036*** -0.039*** 
 [0.635] [0.800] [0.042] [0.048] [0.011] [0.014] 
ROA𝑡−1 0.211*** 0.213***     
 [0.021] [0.026]     
Z Score𝑡−1   0.838*** 0.804***   
   [0.013] [0.015]   
EDF𝑡−1     0.049 0.063 
     [0.032] [0.041] 
Fcovenant 0.161 0.176 0.012 0.007 -0.013* -0.023** 
 [0.463] [0.584] [0.031] [0.035] [0.008] [0.011] 
Total loan size 0.167 0.449 -0.009 0.011 -0.001 -0.010* 
 [0.236] [0.297] [0.017] [0.020] [0.004] [0.005] 
Maturity -0.135 -0.019 0.006 -0.000 -0.003 0.000 
 [0.341] [0.430] [0.023] [0.026] [0.006] [0.008] 
Total firm size -0.222 0.093 0.009 -0.013 0.009** 0.012** 
 [0.242] [0.304] [0.018] [0.021] [0.004] [0.005] 
Book-to-market -5.310*** -5.837*** -0.146*** -0.146*** 0.052*** 0.065*** 
 [0.585] [0.738] [0.041] [0.046] [0.011] [0.015] 
Leverage -2.685** -1.741 0.087 -0.049 0.114*** 0.134*** 
 [1.246] [1.570] [0.093] [0.106] [0.021] [0.028] 
Transaction value 0.364** 0.014 -0.013 0.002 -0.010*** -0.008** 
 [0.182] [0.230] [0.012] [0.014] [0.003] [0.004] 
Cash 1.695 -0.123 0.252*** 0.179* 0.001 0.059** 
 [1.208] [1.522] [0.086] [0.098] [0.020] [0.027] 
Combined 2.025* -0.159 0.256*** 0.224** -0.005 0.054** 
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 [1.186] [1.494] [0.085] [0.097] [0.020] [0.026] 
Relative deal size -3.977*** -1.347 -0.392*** -0.413*** 0.089*** 0.088*** 
 [0.974] [1.228] [0.064] [0.073] [0.017] [0.022] 
       
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Obs. 2,278 2,278 1,823 1,818 2,027 1,713 
R-Squared 0.162 0.124 0.795 0.742 0.252 0.238 
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Table 8. Unadjusted acquirers’ post-merger operating performance - Propensity 
Score Matching 
This table compares the differences of post-merger operating performance between the acquirers who 
have taken syndicated loans and those who have not taken syndicated loans (i.e., Loan-financed M&A 
deals vs. Non-loan-financed M&A deals) and analyzes the acquirers’ post-merger operating performance 
after taking loans from different types of lenders (relationship lenders, transactional lenders, institutional 
lenders and reputable lenders) by using propensity score matching approach to address the potential 
problem of selection bias. The subscripts t-1, t+1 and t+2 denote the year prior to the merger, one year 
and two year after the merger, respectively. The dependent variables are ROA at t +1, ROA at t + 2, 
Altman's Z Score at t + 1, Altman's Z Score at t + 2, EDF at t + 1 and EDF at t + 2 respectively. The 
year fixed effects and 1-digit industry fixed effects are controlled for in the regressions. Detailed variables 
definition can be found in Appendix A. The one-to-one pair match without replacement (with caliper of 
0.01) is used to match Loan-financed M&A deals with Non-loan-financed M&A deals, to match 
relationship lender financed M&A deals with non-relationship lender-financed M&A deals, to match 
transactional lender financed M&A deals with non-transactional lender-financed M&A deals, to match 
institutional lender financed M&A deals with non-institutional lender-financed M&A deals and to match 
reputable lender financed M&A deals with non-reputable lender-financed M&A deals. The PSM 
estimator and the bootstrap standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. Levels of statistical significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
Panel A LF vs NLF 
Variables Estimator Bootstrap S.E. 
ROA𝑡+1 9.330 2.415*** 
ROA𝑡+2 7.600 2.109*** 
Z − Score𝑡+1 0.958 0.074*** 
Z − Score𝑡+2 0.973 0.094*** 
EDF𝑡+1 -0.017 0.010* 
EDF𝑡+2 -0.018 0.014 
 
 
Panel B Relationship lenders 
Variables Estimator Bootstrap S.E. 
ROA𝑡+1 2.347 0.615*** 
ROA𝑡+2 1.705 0.897* 
Z − Score𝑡+1 0.396 0.069*** 
Z − Score𝑡+2 0.338 0.072*** 
EDF𝑡+1 -0.033 0.010*** 
EDF𝑡+2 -0.023 0.011** 
 
 
Panel C Transactional lenders 
Variables Estimator Bootstrap S.E. 
ROA𝑡+1 -0.226 0.596 
ROA𝑡+2 -0.546 0.759 
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Z − Score𝑡+1 0.031 0.076 
Z − Score𝑡+2 -0.063 0.060 
EDF𝑡+1 -0.002 0.011 
EDF𝑡+2 0.003 0.014 
 
 
Panel D Institutional lenders 
Variables Estimator Bootstrap S.E. 
ROA𝑡+1 0.156 3.238 
ROA𝑡+2 0.933 3.626 
Z − Score𝑡+1 -0.948 0.261*** 
Z − Score𝑡+2 -0.933 0.368** 
EDF𝑡+1 0.090 0.065 
EDF𝑡+2 0.068 0.088 
 
 
Panel E Reputable lenders 
Variables Estimator Bootstrap S.E. 
ROA𝑡+1 1.785 0.427*** 
ROA𝑡+2 1.728 0.584*** 
Z − Score𝑡+1 0.271 0.071*** 
Z − Score𝑡+2 0.268 0.065*** 
EDF𝑡+1 -0.035 0.009*** 
EDF𝑡+2 -0.035 0.009*** 
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Table 9. Summary statistics – Industry-adjusted acquirers performance and deal 
characteristics 
The M&A sample consists of M&A deals whose acquirers are U.S. firms and transaction values are at 
least $1 million dollars announced in the period from 1 January, 2005 to 31 December, 2011.  
ROA𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 is the acquirer’s industry-adjusted ROA in the year before the M&A deal’s announcement date.   
Z Score𝐼𝐴𝑡−1is the acquirer’s industry -adjusted Altman’s Z-score in the year before the M&A deal’s 
announcement date calculated by excluding term X4. EDF𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 is the acquirer’s industry-adjusted EDF 
in the year before the M&A deal’s announcement date. ROA𝐼𝐴𝑡+1, Z_Score𝐼𝐴𝑡+1 and EDF𝐼𝐴𝑡+1represent 
the acquirer’s industry-adjusted ROA, Z-score and EDF one year after the M&A deal’s announcement 
year. ROA𝐼𝐴𝑡+2, Z_Score𝐼𝐴𝑡+2 and EDF𝐼𝐴𝑡+2 represent the acquirer’s industry-adjusted ROA, Z-score and 
EDF two years after the M&A deal’s announcement year. Total loan size is defined as the natural 
logarithm of total size of the loan plus 1 million. Total firm size is defined as the natural logarithm of 
total asset of the acquirer plus 1 million. Book-to-market is the ratio of the acquirer’s book value equity 
to its market value equity. Leverage is the ratio of the acquirer’s total long term debt to its total asset. 
Transaction value is defined as the natural logarithm of the M&A deal’s transaction value. Relative deal 
size is the ratio of the value of the M&A transaction to the acquirer’s total asset. Cash is a dummy variable 
that equals to 1 if the M&A deal’s payment method is 100% by cash and 0 otherwise. Combined is a 
dummy variable that equals to 1 if the M&A deal’s payment method is by cash plus stock and 0 otherwise. 
Detailed variables definition can be found in Appendix A. The data for total loan size, total firm size, 
book-to-market, leverage, transaction value and relative deal size are winsorized at 1 percentile and 99 
percentile. Levels of statistical significance of the difference between non-loan-financed and loan-
financed at 10%, 5% and 1% are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
Panel A (Industry-adjusted: Loan-financed and non-loan-financed) 
  N Mean S.D. P25 Median P75 
ROA𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 3885 -0.66 19.75 -1.34 1.10 5.21 
Z Score𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 2997 -0.20 1.70 -0.71 0.03 0.78 
EDF𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 3172 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ROA𝐼𝐴𝑡+1 3955 -4.62 47.04 -2.81 0.26 4.08 
Z Score𝐼𝐴𝑡+1 3055 -0.33 1.64 -0.79 -0.09 0.60 
EDF𝐼𝐴𝑡+1 3328 0.07 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ROA𝐼𝐴𝑡+2 3955 -5.94 45.73 -3.70 0.02 3.61 
Z − Score𝐼𝐴𝑡+2 3054 -0.38 1.68 -0.85 -0.11 0.56 
EDF𝐼𝐴𝑡+2 2878 0.10 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Total firm size 3891 6.88 2.12 5.47 6.82 8.16 
Book-to-market 3723 0.53 0.40 0.28 0.45 0.68 
Leverage 3874 0.19 0.20 0.01 0.13 0.30 
Transaction value 3955 4.03 1.88 2.70 3.96 5.30 
Cash 3955 0.38 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Combined 3955 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Relative deal size 3891 0.22 0.46 0.02 0.06 0.20 
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Panel B (Industry-adjusted: Non-loan-financed) 
  N Mean S.D. P25 Median P75 
ROA𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 1476 -4.77 28.53 -3.42 0.31 4.12 
Z Score𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 1081 -0.97 2.17 -2.06 -0.37 0.41 
EDF𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 992 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ROA𝐼𝐴𝑡+1 1539 -12.22 73.60 -7.69 -0.29 2.70 
Z Score𝐼𝐴𝑡+1 1130 -1.06 2.07 -2.07 -0.50 0.32 
EDF𝐼𝐴𝑡+1 1124 0.08 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.01 
ROA𝐼𝐴𝑡+2 1539 -13.74 70.70 -8.23 -0.53 2.19 
Z − Score𝐼𝐴𝑡+2 1131 -1.12 2.14 -2.24 -0.49 0.33 
EDF𝐼𝐴𝑡+2 997 0.12 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.07 
Total firm size 1480 5.81 2.07 4.32 5.65 6.97 
Book-to-market 1393 0.55 0.43 0.27 0.46 0.72 
Leverage 1470 0.11 0.18 0.00 0.03 0.15 
Transaction value 1539 3.32 1.70 2.08 3.23 4.40 
Cash 1539 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Combined 1539 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Relative deal size 1480 0.30 0.58 0.03 0.09 0.29 
 
Panel C (Industry-adjusted: Loan-financed) 
  N Mean S.D. P25 Median P75 
ROA𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 2409 1.86 10.65 -0.84 1.85 5.59 
Z Score𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 1916 0.24 1.15 -0.40 0.20 0.91 
EDF𝐼𝐴𝑡−1 2180 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ROA𝐼𝐴𝑡+1 2416 0.23 10.63 -1.65 1.14 4.54 
Z Score𝐼𝐴𝑡+1 1925 0.10 1.13 -0.47 0.08 0.76 
EDF𝐼𝐴𝑡+1 2204 0.06 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ROA𝐼𝐴𝑡+2 2416 -0.97 13.29 -2.37 0.65 4.12 
Z − Score𝐼𝐴𝑡+2 1923 0.05 1.15 -0.52 0.04 0.71 
EDF𝐼𝐴𝑡+2 1881 0.08 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Total firm size 2411 7.54 1.86 6.30 7.39 8.67 
Book-to-market 2330 0.52 0.38 0.28 0.45 0.66 
Leverage 2404 0.24 0.20 0.07 0.20 0.36 
Transaction value 2416 4.49 1.84 3.14 4.44 5.75 
Cash 2416 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Combined 2416 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Relative deal size 2411 0.17 0.37 0.02 0.05 0.16 
6
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Table 10. OLS regressions – Industry-adjusted acquirers’ post-merger operating 
performance and creditworthiness (H1, H2, H3, H4 and H5) 
This table analyzes the acquirers’ post-merger operating performance after taking syndicated loans, 
taking loans from relationship lenders, transactional lenders, institutional lenders and reputable lenders 
using the respective OLS regressions. The subscripts t-1, t+1 and t+2 denote the year prior to the merger, 
one year and two year after the merger, respectively. The dependent variables in Column (1) - (6) are 
industry-adjusted ROA at t +1, industry-adjusted ROA at t + 2, industry-adjusted Altman's Z Score at t 
+ 1, industry-adjusted Altman's Z Score at t + 2, industry-adjusted EDF at t + 1 and industry-adjusted 
EDF at t + 2 respectively. The year fixed effects are controlled for in the regressions. Detailed variables 
definition can be found in Appendix A. For the economy of space, only coefficients and standard errors 
of key variables of interest and fit of the regression models are reported in the table. Standard errors are 
calculated at firm level and reported in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
Panel A LF vs NLF 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Regression 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟏 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟐 𝐙 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟏 𝐙 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟐 𝐄𝐃𝐅𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟏 𝐄𝐃𝐅𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟐 
Variables Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Loan Fin 
dummy 
3.324** 2.518 0.053 0.102** -0.028*** -0.049*** 
 [1.667] [1.553] [0.035] [0.042] [0.007] [0.010] 
Obs. 3718 3718 2876 2868 2964 2520 
R-Squared 0.190 0.167 0.793 0.721 0.242 0.205 
 
Panel B Relationship lenders 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Regression 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟏 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟐 𝐙 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟏 𝐙 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟐 𝐄𝐃𝐅𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟏 𝐄𝐃𝐅𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟐 
Variables Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Relationship 2.121*** 1.479* 0.056 0.061 -0.023** -0.013 
 [0.602] [0.757] [0.040] [0.045] [0.010] [0.014] 
Obs. 2280 2280 1825 1820 2029 1715 
R-Squared 0.162 0.122 0.741 0.677 0.247 0.222 
 
Panel C Transactional lenders 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Regression 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟏 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟐 𝐙 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟏 𝐙 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟐 𝐄𝐃𝐅𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟏 𝐄𝐃𝐅𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟐 
Variables Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Transactional -0.173 -0.369 0.052 0.002 0.002 -0.008 
 [0.610] [0.767] [0.040] [0.046] [0.010] [0.014] 
Obs. 2280 2280 1825 1820 2029 1715 
R-Squared 0.158 0.120 0.741 0.676 0.245 0.223 
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Panel D Institutional lenders 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Regression 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟏 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟐 𝐙 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟏 𝐙 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟐 𝐄𝐃𝐅𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟏 𝐄𝐃𝐅𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟐 
Variables Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Institutional -2.449** -3.343*** 0.027 -0.021 0.052*** 0.012 
 [1.005] [1.287] [0.067] [0.076] [0.017] [0.023] 
Obs. 2280 2280 1825 1820 2029 1715 
R-Squared 0.160 0.123 0.741 0.676 0.249 0.223 
 
Panel E Reputable lenders 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Regression 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟏 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟐 𝐙 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟏 𝐙 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟐 𝐄𝐃𝐅𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟏 𝐄𝐃𝐅𝑰𝑨𝒕+𝟐 
Variables Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Reputable 2.044*** 1.462* 0.062 0.045 -0.033*** -0.037** 
 [0.636] [0.798] [0.042] [0.048] [0.011] [0.014] 
Obs. 2280 2280 1825 1820 2029 1715 
R-Squared 0.161 0.121 0.741 0.677 0.249 0.226 
 
